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Improving Process in Virginia Capital Cases
Robert H. Robinson, Jr.*
While the idea of the death penalty as a form of punishment seems
without question to have passed constitutional muster in both federal1 and
state courts,2 the debate over its fairness and constitutionality has shifted to
a consideration of the process by which it is imposed. Whether it is cruel
and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment is not presently consid-
ered seriously by any court.? With most states using lethal injection as the
means of execution, the Eighth Amendment inquiry does not have the
impact that it did when the electric chair was used.' Other arguments
attacking the constitutionality of the death penalty have also failed. Racial
bias in capital cases, while well-documented, has not provided a strong
enough basis for calling the penalty into question.' Also, many groups have
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington and Lee University School of Law; M.A.,
Boston College; B.A., Hampden-Sydney College.
1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding that "the infliction of death
as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally
severe").
2. See, e.g., Pope v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 352 (Va. 1987). Although the Supreme
Court of Virginia usually dismisses arguments that the Virginia capital statute is unconstitu-
tional with a minimum of discussion and consideration, defense counsel should continue to
make this claim as a matter of routine so that the issue will not be defaulted in the unlikely
event of a change in courts' treatment. A sample motion may be obtained from the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
3. The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in a Florida case, Bryan v. Moore,
after several problems with the electric chair caused the prisoners to bleed profusely or take
a long time to die, but dismissed the writ as improvidently granted once Florida agreed to let
defendants choose the form of execution. 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000).
4. Only four states still have the electric chair as the sole means of execution, and
seven use the electric chair in certain circumstances. Death Penalty Information Center (visited
April 4, 2000) < http://www.essential.org/dpic/methods/.html >.
5. Stephen Bright, Challenging Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, CHAMPION,
Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 19, 22-23; see also, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (holding
that statistical evidence of racial disparity in the charging and convictions in capital cases is
not a violation of due process). After his retirement, Justice Powell later told his biographer
that the five-to-four McCleskey decision, which he authored, was the only vote he would have
changed, since he had come to the conclusion that the death penalty should be abolished.
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451-52 (1994).
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made moral, rather than constitutional, arguments against the death
penalty,6 but these efforts at attacking the death penalty have failed to sway
the court system or legislative bodies to reject capital punishment! In the
Supreme Court, there are no Justices, like Justices Brennan and Marshall in
the past, who file automatic dissents in death penalty cases stating that it is
cruel and unusual.' Moreover, the various attacks on the death penalty have
had little effect on the public, which still seems to be strongly in favor of it.9
So where do defense attorneys now look to attack the death penalty?
Our personal opposition may be strong, but how do we convince courts and
the general public that the death penalty has serious problems and is not a
solution to the crime problem? Fortunately, overzealous prosecutors and
courts have provided an answer: the death penalty itself may be constitu-
tional, but the system by which it is imposed is not. Lawyers have long
been aware of specific glitches in the system-the so-called "machinery of
6. Many religions have taken an active role in opposing capital punishment. For
example, the Pope recently stated "(n]or can I fail to mention the unnecessary recourse to the
death penalty when other bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an
aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons .... This model of society
[where the death penalty is seen as a cure for crime] bears the stamp of the culture of death,
and is therefore in opposition to the Gospel message." Pope John Paul I, National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, United States Catholic Conference (visited April 4, 2000)
<http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/national/criminal/stlouissmt.htm>.
7. Some states and governors have considered moratoriums on executions and reviews
of the death penalty processes. Nebraska's unicameral legislature passed a moratorium last
year, but the Governor vetoed it. Debbie Howlett, Moratorium Effort Intensifies in Illinois,
USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2000. Maryland Governor Parris Glendening is planning to fund a
study of the fairness of his state's death penalty scheme. Paul Schwartzman, Glendening
Proposes Study of Executions, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2000, at B2.
8. See, e.g., Watkins v. Murray, 493 U.S. 907, 908 (1989) (Brennan, J., and Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976)
(Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting)).
9. According to the 1999 Quality of Life in Virginia Survey by Virginia Tech Center
for Survey Research:
[T0hree-fourths (74%) of Virginians (versus 80% in 1997) favor the death penalty
or convicted murderers .... However, when given the alternative of a life
sentence without the possibility of parole for 25 years, combined with a require-
ment that the prisoner work for money that would go to families of murder
victims, 55 percent would agree with eliminating the dath penalty, with women
(58% versus 52% for men) and younger residents (60% versus 50% or those over
age 40) particularly supportive of this alternative.
Susan M. Willis-Walton and Alan E. Bayer, Quality ofLife in Virginia: 1999 (Research Design
and Highlights) (visited Mar. 7, 2000) < http://gopher.vt.edu: 1002 1/centers/survey/qol/
highlts.html >. Interestingly, after the Governor of Mllinois instituted a moratorium on all
executions in the state after over a dozen inmates were released from death row, a poll
indicated that the moratorium was supported by two-thirds of the state's voters. Rick
Pearson, Support for Ryan Hits New Low; Poll Finds More Disapproval Than Approval as
License Scandal Takes Toll, CH. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2000, at Al.
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death"'°-and taken together, these glitches indicate that the system as a
whole has problems. These glitches, combined with reviewing courts'
eagerness to avoid new trials and reversals," have created cases in which the
results are very questionable and seemingly arbitrary. In many jurisdictions,
the shortcomings of the capital process have raised serious doubt about the
ability of the current laws to lead to a fair outcome in any case. The law of
capital procedure clearly needs improvements.
This article suggests ways of improving the process of capital cases in
Virginia, and in doing so, critiques the Commonwealth's current death
penalty-laws. Other states and the federal government have reformed their
capital laws, and ihis article reviews these reforms for possible adoption in
Virginia. In making these suggestions, this article presumes that death
penalty cases, because of the finality of the punishment, should be treated
more carefully and deliberately than average criminal cases.
L Problems With the System: Recent Events in Illinois
Although defense attorneys are well aware of the lack of protections of
a capital defendant's constitutional rights, the issue was brought to the
attention of the general public with the recent exonerations of thirteen
people on Illinois's death row. 2 Because of concerns that other death row
inmates may also be innocent, the Governor of Illinois issued a moratorium
on executions until a committee reviews the flaws of the death penalty
system in the state.' 3  He stated, "disbarred lawyers, jailhouse
informants-those kinds of problems are in the system, and we've got to get
them out." 4 The Governor's action was in response to the fact that Illinois
has released more people from death row than it has executed since the
death penalty was reinstated in 1977-thirteen and twelve, respectively."
The problems with many of the death penalty convictions were thor-
oughly documented in a five-part investigative report in the Chicago Tribune
which detailed problems ranging from prosecutorial misconduct to testi-
mony of jailhouse informants. 6  For example, the series reported that
10. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. For a detailed discussion of the shift in the treatment of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), see Ashley Flynn, Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 165, 169 (1999) (analyzing Strickler
v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999)).
12. William Claiborne, Illinois OrderonExecutionsLauded, GovernorBacksMoratorium
After 13 Death Row Inmates Are Exonerated, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2000, at A2.
13. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty; Illinois First State to
Impose Moratorium on Executions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, at Al.
14. Id.
15. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Gov. Ryan Plans to Block the Execution ofany Death
Row Inmates, CHI. TRM., Jan 30, 2000 at Al.
16. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed, Ci. TRm., Nov. 14,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2932178 [hereinafter Derailed); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills,
2000]
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questionable snitch testimony was used in at least forty-six of the 285 death
penalty cases in Illinois and that thirty-three inmates on death row were
represented by attorneys who were later suspended or disbarred." The
problems in Illinois are illustrative of problems that plague the administra-
tion of the death penalty on both the state and federal levels and show that
additional safeguards are needed to ensure that all defendants receive due
process. They also provide an impetus for change.
"Illinois touched off this powder keg," said one Democratic [U.S.] Senate
aide [speaking about new federal legislation that would require states to
allow for the introduction of newly obtained scientific evidence]. "The
idea is that this is one state that's only carried out a dozen executions. It's
all the more reason to be concerned about states like Texas and Florida
that are in a competition to carry off the most executions.""
II The ABA's Involvement in the Debate
The importance of the death penalty has caused it to be the subject of
a great deal of study and review, with particular attention paid to the repre-
sentation received by capital defendants. Discussing the difficulties with
indigent capital defense, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski recently stated, "[T]he jurisprudence of death
is so complex, so esoteric, so harrowing, this is the one area where there
aren't enough lawyers willing and able to handle all the current cases. "19
Perhaps the most important studies of the death penalty in general, and
the role of counsel in particular, have been done by the American Bar
Association ("ABA"), which has researched and offered suggestions for
reform of the death penalty. The ABA officially takes a neutral position
toward the death penalty as a punishment, except that it opposes the execu-
tion of mentally retarded individuals and defendants who were under the
age of eighteen at the time of the offense.2" In 1986, the ABA created the
Death Penalty Representation Project, which recruits volunteer lawyers to
Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2932352; Ken
Armstrong & Steve Mills, The Jailhouse Informant, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, available in
1999 WL 2933041 [hereinafter Informant]; Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, A Tortured Path
to Death Row, CHI. TRiB., Nov. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2933090; Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, Convicted by a Hair, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2933194.
17. Armstrong & Mills, supra note 13.
18. Mike Doming, Senator to Propose Death Row Safeguards, CHI. TRm., Feb. 10, 2000,
at Al.
19. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, For an Honest Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1995, at A21.
20. Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, ReportRegarding Implementation oftheAmerican
BarAssociation's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning theDeath Penalty and Calling
for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3,40,46 (Fall 1996).
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represent inmates on death row.21 Further, it established the Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, which conducted a study of how capital
convictions are reviewed on appeal.2 After a year of research, the task force
issued Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's
Recommendations Concerning Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related
Materials from the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's
Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus ("Report"). The Report "com-
prises a carefully crafted package of interconnected reforms designed as a
whole to make the process less complex and to preserve fairness," and
contained sixteen recommendations ("Recommendations") to accomplish
this goal.3 Although the entire Report is too extensive to discuss in this
article, the critical proposals center on the appointment of competent
counsel (Recommendations One through Six)2 and a one-year statute of
limitations on new appeals (Recommendation Thirteen).
The Recommendations concerning appointment of trial counsel are of
central importance because of the ripple effect trial errors have throughout
the stages of trial and review:
[C]apital litigation in the United States today too often begins with poor
legal representation. Thereafter, the petitioner, the state, and society pay
the price as each successive stage of the case becomes more complicated,
more protracted, and more costly. Poor representation after the trial is
also not uncommon, and it, too, imposes costs-in terms of both effi-
ciency and fairness-at each successive stage of the litigation. The goals
of better, more efficient, and more orderly justice can be achieved when
the quality of legal representation at all stages of capital cases is im-
proved.26
Capital representation disaster stories are well known,2" but the ABA report
requires more than minimum attentiveness and diligence for capital cases.
Recommendation One states that defense attorneys should be competent
and adequately compensated in accordance with the ABA Guidelines For
21. id.
22. Id.
23. ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTYHABEAS CORPUS, TOWARD A MOREJUST
AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES, A REPORT CON-
TAINING THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEATH
PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS AND RELATED MATERIALS FROM THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION CRIMINALJUSTICE SECTION'S PROJECT ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS (1990)
[hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS].
24. Id. at 6-17.
25. Id. at 30-35.
26. Id. at 17.




the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
("Guidelines").2
Recommendations Two through Six set out specific suggestions for
reform, some of which have broader policy implications. Recommendation
Two suggests that local bar associations should influence the appointment
of defense counsel, and Recommendation Three proposes that jurisdictions
with the death penalty should establish and fund an organization to "recruit,
select, train, monitor, support, and assist attorneys involved at all stages of
capital litigation and, if necessary, to participate in the trial of such cases."29
Recommendations Four and Five deal with the appointment of counsel for
appeals: the ABA recommends that the trial counsel should be replaced by
new appointed counsel for both the state direct appeal and all subsequent
appellate proceedings.30 Perhaps the most sweeping recommendation is
number Six, which states that the procedural barriers-exhaustion of state
judicial remedies, procedural default rules, and the presumption of correct-
ness of state court findings of fact-should not apply to federal habeas review
when the defendant was denied adequate representation of counsel as
outlined in Recommendation One.3
Unfortunately, the response to the Report was so poor that the ABA
reviewed the matter and passed, by a vote of 280 to 119, a resolution calling
for a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty.32 Indeed, the
Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association's
Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and
Calling for a Moratorium on Executions ("Resolution"), found that "not-
withstanding the enormous efforts of the ABA, the crisis in capital cases has
only worsened .... Judicial decisions have contributed to the crisis."" The
Resolution asked for a moratorium until all jurisdictions with the death
penalty: (1) implemented the Guidelines for the Appointment and Perfor-
mance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and other policies regarding
competency of attorneys; (2) "preserve[d], enhance[d], and streamline[d]
state and federal courts' authority and responsibility to exercise independent
judgment on the merits of constitutional claims in state post-conviction and
federal habeas corpus proceedings;" (3) made serious efforts to eradicate
racial discrimination in capital sentencing; and (4) ended the execution of
mentally retarded defendants and of persons who were under eighteen years
28. ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENTAND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
29. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 23, at 1.
30. Id. at 1-2.
31. Id. at 2.
32. See James Podgers, Time Out for Executions, A.B.A.J., April 1997, at 26; Kara
Thompson, The ABA 's Resolution Callingfora Moratorium on Executions: Wbat jurisdictions
Can Do To Ensure That theDeatb Penalty Is ImposedResponsibly, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1515 (1998).
33. Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 20, at 4.
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old at the time of the offense.' This Resolution remains in effect. The
Charlottesville-Albemarle (Virginia) Bar Association passed a similar resolu-
tion-the fourth of its kind in the country and the first in Virginia-in April
of 1999.1s
The Virginia Public Defender Commission ("Commission"), along with
the Virginia State Bar is charged with creating and maintaining standards
("Standards") for appointment of counsel in capital cases under section 19.2-
163.8(E) of the Virginia Code. 6 Although the statute authorizing the
Standards does not mandate it, the Commission strongly encourages that
two attorneys be appointed in every capital case." The Standards list the
various requirements that lead trial counsel and co-counsel must meet in
order to be appointed, as well as the minimum requirements for appellate
counsel and habeas corpus counsel. The ABA Guidelines are very similar
to the Standards in that they both emphasize that two attorneys are needed
in every capital case, and that those attorneys must meet certain levels of
experience, training, and familiarity with criminal law, felony cases, and
jury trials.3
However, the Guidelines go beyond the Standards in several respects.
First, Guideline 7.1 states that the appointing authority, described in Guide-
line 3.1 as either a central defenders office or a committee of no fewer than
five attorneys familiar with criminal defense law, should "monitor the
performance of assigned counsel to ensure that the client is receiving quality
representation" and remove any attorney from the roster of qualified
attorneys if "there is compelling evidence that he has inexcusably ignored
basic responsibilities of an effective lawyer, resulting in prejudice to the
client's case."" The Standards do not contain a similar monitoring provi-
sion and make no mention of performance-based grounds for removal from
the list of qualified attorneys.
Second, the Guidelines establish certain performance criteria for every
stage of a capital trial, from pre-indictment' through clemency4' proceed-
34. Id. at 49.
35. Frank Green, Execution Moratorium Urged Action By Bar Group Apparent First for
Virginia, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1999, at B1.
36. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.8(E) (Michie 1999).
37. VIRGINIA PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, STANDARDS FOR THE QUALIFICA-
TIONS OF APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES (1999).
38. GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 2.1-5.1.
39. Id. at 7.1.A.
40. Guideline 11.3 reads:
Counsel appointed in any case in which the death penalty is apossible punish-
ment shoul, even the prosecutor as not indicated that te deat penalty will be
sought, begi* preparation for the case as one in which the death penalty will be
sought while employing strategies to have the case designated by the prosecution
as a non-capital one.
2000] 369
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ings. The Guidelines pertaining to performance criteria are very precise and
extensive. For example, Guideline 11.4.1 provides a thorough list of docu-
ments, reports, potential witnesses (both lay and expert), and mitigation
sources that defense counsel should pursue and acquire." This Guideline
even states that defense counsel should meet with the accused within
twenty-four hours of being appointed to the case,43 as well as locate mem-
bers of the victim's family that may be opposed to the imposition of the
death penalty in the particular case." Even though these Guidelines are not
binding in Virginia, they are an excellent checklist for attorneys with capital
cases in that they cover the many angles that a capital case may take and
offer suggestions that may lead defense counsel to a strategy previously
overlooked."
The ABA Report and Guidelines together provide in-depth reviews of
the current state of death penalty law and offer several helpful suggestions.
However, the ABA premise that ensuring good attorneys with plenty of
resources will result in a fair and efficient administration of the death
penalty is perhaps too simplistic. Even the best capital defense attorneys
face inequities and difficulties under the Virginia Code and state case law."
The Virginia capital defense bar, through tenacious representation and
repeated efforts, has improved capital law immensely. Yarbrough v. Com-
Id. at 11.3 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 11.9.4.
42. Id. at 11.4.1.
43. Id. at 11.4.1.2.
44. Id. at 11.4.1.3.C.
45. For example, Guideline 11.4.1.1 tells defense counsel that:
Copies of all the charging documents in the case should be obtained and exam-
inel in the context of'the applicable statutes and precedents, to identify (inter
alia):
A. the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s) alleged to make
the death penalty applicable;
B. the defenses, ordinary and affirmative, that may be available to the substantive
charge and to the applicability of the death penalty;
C. any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as statutes of limitations or
double jeopardy) which can be raised to attack the charging documents.
Id. at 11.4.1.1. Often, defense counsel, focusing on the larger issues of a capital case, overlook
faults in the indictment and other charging documents. It is the experience of the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse that many of these faults can be mined and exploited by deFene
counsel, whether to simply cause annoyance to the Commonwealth and make the prosecu-
tion look bad in front of the judge, or to develop a whole trial strategy based on the wording
of the charge.
46. See, Alix M. Karl, A Quarter Century ofDeath:A Symposium on Capital Punisbment
in Virginia since Furman v. Georgia: Suggestionsfor CapitalReform in Virginia, 12 CAP. DEF.
J. 123 (1999) (reviewing deficiencies in the Virginia statutory scheme and offering suggestions
for improvement).
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monwealth7 and Lilly v. Virginia" are examples. But, the defense bar still
encounters unfair and confounding outcomes.49 The ABA Recommenda-
tions and Guidelines are good first steps to ensuring due process-especially
since a highly skilled defense bar is necessary to expose and counter the
shortcomings of the Virginia death penalty scheme.
IlL Pre-Indictment Review of Federal Capital Cases
Murder defendants are often haphazardly charged. Often, cases that do
not warrant the death penalty are charged anyway because there are so
many variables that enter into a prosecutor's charging decision. To assure
some consistency in indictments, the federal government created several
innovations. Before a United States Attorney can seek the death penalty,
he or she must receive written authorization from the Attorney General. s
The prosecutor is also encouraged, but not required, "to consult ... with
the appropriate section of the Criminal Division or the Criminal Section of
the Civil Rights Division.""1 This process has effectively narrowed the
number of death penalty cases brought by the federal government. In the
last seven years, Attorney General Janet Reno reviewed 498 submissions for
capital indictments but authorized only 141 of them. 2 This approval
process ensures that the federal prosecutorial power "speaks with one voice"
in defining what cases deserve the death penalty. 3 In effect, this require-
ment is a built-in pre-trial proportionality review.
The process of seeking approval is set out in section 9-10.020 of the
United States Attorney's Manual ("Manual"). The United States Attorney
must prepare a "Death Penalty Evaluation" form and an accompanying
memorandum, which consists of the following parts: "(i) an introduction
... (ii) the theory of liability, (iii) the facts and evidence, including evidence
relating to any aggravating or mitigating factors, (iv) the defendant's back-
47. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999) (extending application of lifemeans life" jury instruction
to all capital murder sentencing phases).
48. 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (remanding case to Supreme Court of Virginia for harmless
error analysis in light of erroneous use of unavailable co-defendant's testimony at trial).
49. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999) (holding that the police's
withholding of evidence that a witness's memory of the events to which she testified in-
proved after extensive police questioning was not prejudicial enough for a new trial); Vinson
v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170 (Va. 1999) (allowing the Commonwealth to twist mitiga-
tion evidence into rebuttal of future dangerousness evidence).
50. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL, at S 9-10.020 (U.S. D.O.J. 1997) [hereinaf-
ter MANUAL].
51. Id.
52. Bill Miller, U.S. Attorney Overruled in Starbucks Slaying Case, WASH. POST, Feb.
10, 2000, at B 1.
53. Id. (citing statements made by Channing D. Phillips, spokesman for United States
Attorney Wilma A. Lewis).
2000]
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ground and criminal history, (v) the basis for Federal prosecution.. . and
(vi) any other relevant information."' This information, along with other
relevant information such as statements from the defense and police and
autopsy reports, is submitted to the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division."
This compilation of documents is reviewed by a committee, pursuant
to section 9-10.050 of the Manual. 6 This committee is appointed by the
Attorney General and must include the Deputy Attorney General and the
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division (or their designees)."'
Defense counsel is permitted to present, either orally or in writing, reasons
why the death penalty should not be sought.5 8 The committee is explicitly
told to consider the possibility of racial bias in the charge itself and in the
federal death penalty scheme overall.5 9 If the indictment is cleared by the
committee, then the prosecutor must file an "Notice of Intention to Seek
the Death Penalty."6°
The standards for the committee's determination are set out in Manual
section 9-10.080.6' These standards are extremely helpful in that they
require thorough and objective deliberation over whether or not to seek a
death sentence. The committee is, in effect, asked to think like a jury and
"determine whether the statutory aggravating factors applicable to the
offense and any non-statutory aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the
mitigating factors applicable to the offense to justify a sentence of death, or,
in the absence of any mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors
themselves are sufficient to justify a sentence of death."6 In addition, the
committee must find that the aggravating factors exist beyond a reasonable
doubt.63 Mitigating factors, which may not have been developed extensively
at that point, are to be considered in the light most favorable to the defen-
dant.' Such careful scrutiny is beneficial to defendants in that it obviously
reduces the number of capital indictments that are actually sought, though
the real reasons for these innovations are stated in the Manual: "there must
be sufficient admissible evidence of the aggravating factors to obtain a death
54. MANUAL, supra note 50, at S 9-10.000.
55. Id.




60. Id.; see also, John P. Cunningham, Comment, Symposium the Federal Courts. Death
in the Federal Courts: Expectations and Realities of the Federal Deatb Penalty Act of 1994,32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 939 (1998).
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sentence and to sustain it on appeal. The authorization process is designed
to promote consistency and fairness." 6' Thus, while there may be fewer
capital indictments charged, the ones that are charged will be extremely
strong prosecution cases.
The Federal Death Penalty Act includes other safeguards. The Act
specifically excludes pregnant women,6 mentally retarded defendants, and
anyone incapable of understanding the death penalty 6 from facing a capital
indictment. Once the Justice Department Committee approves the capital
indictment, the prosecutor must send a statement to the defendant enumer-
ating the aggravating factors.69 This notice is much like a bill of particulars,
but one that is statutorily required. In Virginia, the defendant's request for
a bill of particulars is often denied 0 even though notice of charges is a
constitutional right." Also, the Act requires that two counsel be appointed
to all capital cases."
While Virginia cannot implement a system similar to the federal
government's because of the nature of the relationship between the Office
of the Attorney General and the elected Commonwealth's Attorneys, the
ideas behind the federal scheme are instructive for Virginia death penalty
jurisprudence. The essence of the federal policies is that there should be
some fairness and proportionality when indicting someone to be on trial for
his life and that the decision whether or not to prosecute a capital charge
should not be based entirely on the personal or political views of the prose-
cutor. The gravamen of the Furman v. Georgia' decision, the basis of the
modern death penalty, is that "the death penalty must be imposed fairly,
and with reasonable consistency, or not at aU. " 4 Fairness and consistency
65. Id.
66. 18 U.S.C. S 3596(b) (2000).
67. 18 U.S.C. S 3596(c) (2000).
68. Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. S 3593(a) (2000). Section 3593 of Title 18 of the United States Code states:
The factors for which notice is provided under this subsection may include
factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victi'ns family,
and may indude oral testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies the
victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by
the victim and the victim's family, and any other relevant information.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763, 768 (Va. 1998) (holding that
the decision whether or not to require a bill of particulars is left to the trial judge's decision,
but that the bill of particulars should only be used to challenge the sufficiency of the indict-
ment).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation").
72. 18 U.S.C. S 3005 (2000).
73. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
74. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2000]
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can best begin with the indictment; this is the position taken by the federal
government in its death penalty guidelines.
Virginia has a "hook" for a similar policy in the proportionality re-
quirement of section 17.1-313(C) and (E) of the Virginia Code.75 Subsection
(E) states that records of capital cases "shall be made available to the circuit
courts," apparently so the circuit courts can use them to conduct their own
proportionality consideration. 76 Furthermore, the Commonwealth Attor-
neys could agree to a voluntary review of potential capital cases by the
Attorney General of Virginia, perhaps through a committee comprised of
selected Commonwealth Attorneys and representatives from the Office of
the Attorney General. Voluntary pre-indictment review by such a commit-
tee would be advantageous for all parties involved in capital litigation: the
defendants presumably would get fairer charging decisions, and the Com-
monwealth would have more coordination between the trials and appeals
of capital cases.
IV Unreliable Evidence: Unadjudicated Acts and Snitch Testimony
Although the seriousness of capital cases would seem to require that
only the best evidence be used, two forms of notoriously unreliable evidence
are routinely admitted at capital trials: unadjudicated acts used to show
future dangerousness at penalty phase proceedings and testimony of jail-
house informants. Many of the problems in the Illinois death penalty
debacle are attributable to unreliable evidence.' These types of evidence do
not need to be banned outright, but they can be more cautiously evaluated
and more carefully used.
A. Testimony ofJailhouse Informants
Testimony of jailhouse informants is routinely used but notoriously
unreliable because informants are often given "deals" for their testimony.
Evidence of these deals may be hard for defense counsel to discover and
eventually use in cross-examinations."' Snitches, by nature, are self-serving
75. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C), (E) (Michie 1999).
76. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (Michie 1999); see also, Kelly E. P. Bennett, A
Quarter Century ofDeat: A Symposium on Capital Punishment in Virginia Since Furman v.
Georgia: Proportionality Review: The Historical Application and Deficiencies, 12 CAP. DEF. J.
103 (1999).
77. "In at least forty-six cases where a defendant was sentenced to die, the prosecution's
evidence included a jailhouse informant .... In one Cook County case, the word of a
convicted con man, called a 'pathological liar' by federal authorities, put a man on Death
Row. In exchange for a sharply reduced sentence, the con artist testified that while in jail
together the defendant confessed to him, even though a tape recording of their conversation
contains no confession." Armstrong & Mills, Derailed, supra note 16.
78. For example, in Bramblett v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth decided to use
a jailhouse informant, whom it had planned possibly to use as a rebuttal witness, in its case-in-
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and can be very resourceful in helping themselves by helping the prosecu-
tion. For example, in 1988, a prolific jailhouse informant, Leslie Vernon
White, showed how easy it was to fabricate a confession. By using a phone
at the jail and impersonating various people, he was able to get detailed
information about a murder suspect he had never met and was even able to
falsify jail records to "show" he had shared a cell with the suspect. 9
The reliability of snitch testimony can be greatly increased by requiring
courts to take a closer look at the quality of the evidence, mandating disclo-
sure of evidence of possible deals and issuing a cautionary jury instruction
if questionable practices arise. Oklahoma recently took the step of increas-
ing the reliability of snitch testimony in Dodd v. States0 by requiring exten-
sive pre-trial disclosure by the prosecution about the snitch and his antici-
pated testimony, and by mandating cautionary instructions to the jury
whenever a snitch is used. The court was concerned about reliability
problems with snitches, who often elicit or create statements from the
defendant with the expectation of some benefit.8 Statements made by an
incarcerated defendant awaiting trial that are deliberately* elicited by an
informant working for the state are not admissible under United States v.
Henry.82 However, the Oklahoma court saw that there are reliability
problems in all snitch statements. Whether the informant was already
working for the state or whether he anticipated some future benefit from
eliciting incriminating statements on his own initiative, his initial motiva-
tion is the same.83 The court pointed out that "while the state action af-
fected by such a government/informant relationship triggers careful consti-
tutional scrutiny, it permits equally insidious reliability problems to escape
attention."84
Dodd replaced an earlier opinion in the same case which went even
farther in protecting against unreliable snitch testimony by requiring a
separate, pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility of the snitch's
chief to testify as to several severely incriminating statements allegedly made by defendant.
513 S.E.2d 400, 409 (Va. 1999). It notified defense counsel several days before the snitch was
to testify and only then revealed the snitch's name and criminal record. Id. Defense requested
that the testimony be barred due to the late disclosure of the record which did not give
defense adequate time to investigate the witness, but the court allowed it anyway. Id.
79. Armstrong & Mills, Informant, supra note 16. White admitted that he had lied in
dozens of cases. Id. In response, the district attorney's office established a clearinghouse to
keep track of informants and to provide information that prosecutors could use to corrobo-
rate their testimony. Id.
80. 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
81. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
82. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).




testimony."3 Remains of this decision are contained in the concurrences of
Dodd.16 This pre-trial hearing was much like a Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pbarmaceuticals, Inc. 7 hearing in that the trial court assumed a gatekeeper
role and decided whether or not the snitch would be allowed to testify."8
Supporters of this hearing argued that "the use of such untrustworthy
witnesses carries considerable costs, especially in death-penalty cases where
the stakes are the highest. The misuse of such informants also adds financial
costs to taxpayers when convictions based on their testimony are reversed
to be retried." 9 Apparently, the majority thought a Daubert-type hearing
went too far since "many witnesses, in addition to jailhouse informants, may
have a motive to lie. That is not a sufficient reason to remove the trier of
fact from making a determination of the credibility of such witness."'
To prevent constitutional violations involving snitch testimony, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals revised its earlier decision and in its
new opinion instituted a set of procedures that enhance the reliability of
snitch testimony by giving defense counsel information that will assist with
the cross-examination of the snitch. The state must, ten days before trial,
disclose in discovery:
(1) [T]he complete criminal history of the informant; (2) any deal,
promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or may
make in the future to informant ... ;(3) the speci ic statements made by
the defendant and the time, place, and manner of their disclosure; (4) all
other cases in which the informant testified or offered statements against
an individual but was not called, whether the statements were admitted
in the case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise,
inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony
or statement; (5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testi-
mony or statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such recantation;
and (6) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility.9
This information allows defense attorneys to prepare strategies to counter
the evidence offered by jailhouse snitches. More importantly, these require-
ments may have the effect of discouraging the presentation of snitch evi-
dence that the prosecution knows is questionable. By imposing a high
threshold showing of reliability on the prosecution, the holding of Dodd
85. Id. at 785 (Strubbar, P.J., specially concurring) (citing Dodd v. State, 1999 OK CR
29 (reh'g granted vacating and withdrawing opinion, 70 OBJ 2952 Oct. 6, 1999)).
86. Id.; see also id. at 787 (Craig, A.J., specially concurring).
87. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141
(1999) (holding that, under Daubert, a court's gatekeeping function applies to testimony based
on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge as well as "scientific" knowledge).
88. Dodd, 993 P.2d at 785 (Strubhar, P.J., specially concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 787 (Craig, A.J., specially concurring).
91. Id. at 784.
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ensures that much of the unreliable snitch evidence that is currently pre-
sented will not be admitted in the future.
In addition to these pre-trial disclosures, the Dodd decision also requires
this jury instruction be given any time a court admits jailhouse informant
testimony:
The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant
must be examined and weighed by you with greater care than the testi-
mony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's testimony has
been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is for you to
determine. In making that determination, you should consider: (1)
whether the witness has received anything (including pay, immunity
from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or vindi-
cation) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the infor-
mant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not
called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and
whether the informant received any deal, promise, inducement, or
benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; (3) whether the
informant has ever changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history
of the informant; and (5) any other evidence relevant to the informer's
credibility.
92
No part of this instruction is unreasonable since it merely makes explicit
what juries might already do. It is feasible for defense attorneys in Virginia
to proffer a similar jury instruction.
B. Unadjudicated Prior Acts
Unadjudicated prior acts are used in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit future acts that
would be a threat to society.9" That unadjudicated prior conduct is
admissible at the sentencing phase of capital trials is clear from both case
law' and the language in section 19.2-264.3:2 of the Virginia Code."
Central to the fairness of a capital scheme are individualized sentencing and
heightened reliability." While Virginia's use of unadjudicated acts satisfies
the first of these prongs, it clearly fails the second."7 The Virginia Code
92. Id.
93. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1999).
94. See, e.g., Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 422, 436 (Va. 1985).
95. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 1999).
96. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-305 (1976) (stating that"while the prevailing practice of individualized sentencing determinations generally simply
reflects enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment (demands
more]. Because [death is so serious a penalty], there is a corresponding difference in the need
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.")
97. For an extended discussion of due process requirements and Virginia's use of
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requires that the jury find future dangerousness beyond a reasonable
doubt,98 yet the evidence that comprises that finding is not held to as high
a standard. For example, in Gray v. Netherland, the Commonwealth
introduced facts about a double murder although the only evidence that
Gray committed the murder were statements he allegedly made to a
snitch.1" In addition to the snitch's testimony, the prosecution showed
pictures of the crime scene, called the medical examiner to testify regarding
the autopsy reports, and put on a police detective who testified about the
crime and investigation-all for a crime that was never prosecuted. 10 The
United States Supreme Court held that the evidence was admissible since the
defense had notice (albeit, one day's) and did not ask for a continuance. 2
Unadjudicated acts can be dispositive of a defendant's ultimate fate, but
may be very unreliable. Virginia is one of the few states that impose no
limitation on the admissibility of unadjudicated prior acts. 3 Several states,
including Florida, Alabama, and Tennessee, do not allow the introduction
of evidence of any unadjudicated conduct."° Others, including California,
Georgia, and Arkansas, limit its use through requiring clear and convincing
or reasonable doubt standards, or with the use of limiting instructions.'O'
Virginia should join with these states and put some restrictions on the use
of unadjudicated prior acts. It is ironic that the Commonwealth's capital
sentencing scheme, which should be carefully constructed to protect
constitutional rights such as due process, can include a sentencing factor,
future dangerousness, that often relies on evidence that was not adequate
enough to be brought to trial in the first place.
V Time for Review and the 21-Day Rule
Modification of the so-called "21-day Rule" of the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which mandates that all decisions of the courts are final after
unadjudicated acts, see Tommy Barrett, A Modest Proposal: Requiring Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt For Unadjudicated Acts Offered to Prove Future Dangerousness, CAP. DEF.
J., Spring 1998, at 58.
98. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1999).
99. 518 U.S. 152 (1996).
100. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 156-58 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous
Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1249, 1267
(1993) (stating that six states as of 1993 placed no restrictions on the introduction of
unadjudicated conduct at the sentencing phase: Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Texas, Virginia).
104. Id. at 1277-83.
105. Id.
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twenty-one days, is another critical step to improving due process."° The
rule essentially forecloses the possibility of introducing any new evidence
post-conviction which may cast doubt on the conviction or which may
exculpate the defendant entirely. The rule is archaic, and its applicability to
the death penalty may have been an oversight." Supporters of the 21-day
Rule argue that evidence of innocence can be considered by the Governor
through clemency proceedings.' But clemency is a blunt instrument at
best, since it is usually mired in political considerations and is only rarely
used. Moreover, in Virginia a grant of clemency does not mean that the
defendant is released from prison." There have been only six
commutations of the death penalty in Virginia, and all six defendants remain
in prison even though there is evidence of actual innocence in five of the
cases." 0 Also, the separation of powers doctrine delegates questions of
evidence and the determination of guilt or innocence to the judiciary, not
the executive branch of the government, which further makes clemency an
inappropriate remedy for mistaken convictions.
Most other states.. and the federal government". do not have such a
draconian prohibition on consideration of new evidence. The Virginia
General Assembly has attempted to modify the 21-day Rule, and has nearly
done so on several occasions."3 In the most recent session, delegate James
106. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.1.
107. Joe Jackson and June Arney, Sentenced to Die Without Fair Trials Series: Dead End
on Death Row?, VRGINiAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR (Hampton Roads, Virginia), June 26,
1994, at 2 (quoting a delegate who stated that the Virginia Legislature did not consider the
21-day Rule in drafting the Commonwealth's death penalty statute after Furman).
108. See, VA. CONST. art V, S 12; VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-229 (Michie 1999).
109. For example, Governor Douglas Wilder granted Joseph Giarratano a conditional
pardon and gave Attorney General Mary Sue Terry the choice of whether to grant
Giarratano a new trial, which she declined. Giarratano confessed to fatally stabbing Barbara
Kline and raping and strangling her daughter, even though he claimed to have no memory
of doing so. "The state's psychiatrist in the case later said Giarratano made up part or all of
his confessions, and his lawyers say the confessions are not supported by crime scene
evidence. Hairs and fingerprints found near [one of the victim's] body were not
Giarratano's." Death Sentences Commuted in Virginia, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 15,
1998, at A17.
110. See id.; Frank Green, Gilmore Grants Swann Clemency Sentence Commuted to Life
Without Parole, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May 13, 1999, at A1 (reporting that in Swann's case
there is no question of his guilt, but Governor Gilmore commuted his sentence due to
Swann's severe mental illness).
111. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 nn.8-11 (1993) (comparing the length of
time that new evidence is allowed in various states).
112. See, FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (allowing a new trial based on new evidence within three
years of the verdict).
113. For information on the latest efforts to amend the 21-day rule, visit the web page
of Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty. Virginiansfor Alternatives to the Death
Penalty (visited Apr. 4, 2000) < http://www.vadp.org/21day.htm >.
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F. Almand introduced House Bill 1311 which would have given death row
inmates up to two opportunities in three years to introduce new evidence
indicating a "significant probability... of actual innocence."14 The House
passed the bill by a vote of seventy-five to twenty-three but a Senate com-
mittee rejected it; a compromise version of the bill, which limited the time
period for introduction of new evidence to forty-five days, was held over
until the 2001 session."' Despite widespread agreement that twenty-one
days is too short, many in the General Assembly think a three year
limitation would result in a whole new set of trials and procedures, and
family members of victims argue that too long a period for introduction of
new evidence would never give them closure." 6
Although the 21-day Rule was not modified in the current legislative
session, the pressure is on to change it. While the forty-five day
compromise passed by the Senate Courts of Justice Committee in the 2000
session-which hopefully will be passed by the Senate and House in 2001-is
a good start, deat row inmates will have trouble finding and presenting
such evidence in such a short time.
Recently, United States Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced the
Innocence Protection Act that would force states to provide ways for
inmates to introduce new evidence, particularly evidence gained from new
scientific methods such as DNA analysis."' Leahy, the top-ranking
Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, has also suggested that the
federal government set minimum standards of competency for attorneys
who represent indigent capital defendants.' The interest and attention
generated by House Bill 1311 in the Virginia General Assembly, the events
in Illinois, proposed federal legislation, and the rise in the importance of
DNA evidence in criminal trials all indicate that persons convicted of capital
murder will have greater opportunities to introduce evidence of their
innocence-the question, in Virginia, is when.
V. Conclusion
The recent events in Illinois and other states show that the current
processes used to impose the death penalty are not adequate to guarantee
reliable results. If indeed the death penalty is different, due to its finality,
114. Ruth S. Intress, Emotion High, Bill Narrowed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 6,
2000, at A8.
115. Md The Virginia General Assembly offers a bill tracking system over the world
wide web. See Legislation Information System (visited Apr. 4, 2000)
< http://legl.state.va.us/>.
116. Intress, supra note 114.
117. Frank Green, State Figbts DNA Bid by Deatb Row Inmate, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 24, 2000, at B1.
118. Doming, supra note 18.
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from other punishments society imposes, both the defendants and families
of victims deserve a fair and accurate system. This increased reliability and
efficiency can only be gained through improvements in process. The
current flaws in the process make clear that states cannot succumb to the
demands of a speedier application of the death penalty without sacrificing
a great deal of reliability. Many of the suggestions for reform require very
little sacrifice of time or resources and can easily be implemented in Vir-
ginia-whether by the General Assembly, courts, or perhaps even by skillful
defense attorneys who proffer the proper motions. The repeated claims by
Commonwealth officials that the Virginia death penalty scheme is fair and
has adequate safeguards will soon fall on deaf ears. A better death penalty,
ensured through improvements in process, is good for those who stand to
forfeit their lives and for those who are willing to take those lives.
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